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COMMENTS
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AS A TOOL OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT: MIRANDA V. ARIZONA AND THE
TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
by W. Richard Jones
The concept of limited government is both a compromise and a contra-
diction: a compromise, because the purposes of government are to be
achieved by methods acceptable to the governed; a contradiction, because
restraints upon the exercise of power necessarily impede the accomplish-
ment of those goals for whose achievement power was conferred. Through-
out the field of criminal law the limited government concept creates com-
promise and contradiction. These elements are especially apparent when
power is limited by requirements of fair procedure in an effort to attain a
truly just system of law enforcement.
Seeking to implement constitutional directives, the United States Su-
preme Court has limited the power of state police to interrogate by impos-
ing stringent requirements of fair procedure.1 While the Court has been
criticized by some for developing a criminal code from the fourteenth
amendment's broad guarantee of due process,' a majority of the justices
today view the implementation of strict standards as the only guarantee
that due process will be preserved inviolate.8 Adhering to this policy, an
emphatically specific Court has delineated exacting rules for interrogation
of suspects by state police. Miranda v. Arizona declares that "the prosecu-
tion may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stem-
ming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards"4 including an adequate warning to the
suspect of his rights, and the presence of counsel at interrogation if de-
'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
' Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, in Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1 at f04, declared that the
Court's opinion in that case is a "new constitutional code of rules for confessions." See also
GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 134 (1966); Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965).
' It has been established that the increasingly stringent requirements imposed by the Court ex-
cluding the use of certain types of evidence are not necessarily required by the Constitution, but
are rather methods adopted by the Court for the protection of constitutional rights. Thus, in his
concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1962), Mr. Justice Black stated: "I agree
with what appears to be a plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusionary
rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which
Congress might negate." See also note 85 infra.
4 384 U.S. 436 at 444.
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sired. Earlier cases, such as White v. Maryland' and Hamilton v. Alabama,
had developed due process prior to the formal trial. As soon as the legal
process reached the point where "definable rights could be won or lost"'
certain constitutional rights attached! In Escobedo v. Illinois' the Supreme
Court declared that when an investigation has "focused on the accused"
he is entitled to representation by counsel. Because counsel in Escobedo had
been retained by the accused prior to his arrest, however, much controversy
concerning its correct interpretation developed. Miranda v. Arizona at-
tempts to clarify and extend the Escobedo holding."
The new Texas Code of Criminal Procedure also places limitations upon
the power of police to interrogate suspects.1' An extensive warning must
be administered by a magistrate to the individual before interrogation, and
he is given the right to consult with an attorney at that time. The develop-
ment of additional duties of fair procedure by Miranda and by the new
code necessitate substantial correlation. And, the limitations which both im-
pose must be harmonized with the requisite efficiency of police activity
within the concept of due process of law.
I. INTERROGATION AS A TOOL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Police interrogation has been the focus of considerable controversy in
5 373 U.S. 59 (1963). The defendant pleaded guilty at a preliminary hearing where he was not
assisted by counsel. Upon later entering a plea of not guilty, his guilty plea was introduced against
him. The Supreme Court held that this preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" of the case at
which the denial of counsel offended due process standards.
6 368 U.S. 52 (1961). Counsel was denied at arraignment on .a capital charge at which the
accused was required to enter a plea. The case was reversed for lack of counsel at this stage.
7 Mr. Justice White, discussing these cases in his dissent in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
497 (1964).
8 The majority in Escolrro stated: "The 'guiding hand of counsel' was essential to advise peti.
tioner of his rights is.this delicate situation. This was the 'stage when legal aid and advice' were
most critical to petitioner. It was a stage surely as critical as was the arraignment in Hamilton v.
Alabama and the preliminary hearing in White v. Maryland. What happened at this interrogation
could certainly 'affect the whole trial.'" (Citations omitted.) 378 U.S. 478. 486 (1964).
Similar cases are Walton v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 28 (1962) (arraignment was held 'critical' be-
cause the accused had to acknowledge the voluntariness of his confession); Chewning v. Cunning-
ham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) (appointed counsel was held necessary at such a hearing); Reynolds v.
Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961) (suspect was held to have a right to his own retained counsel at
arraignment for violation of a second offender statute) ;.-Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954)
(same). But cf., Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959), holding that a hearing
on problems of ambulance chasing not sufficient to require the presence of retained counsel.
9378 U.S. 478 (1964).
"°The case of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (196T) held that tle prohibition against self-
incrimination is a part of due process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Miranda ex-
tends the application of this protection beyond the holding in Griffin.
Although predicated upon the fifth, rather than the sixth amendment, Miranda extends the
right of an accused to counsel, and thus clarifies the interpretation of the latter amendment in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In light of such cases as Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961), which had declared that the right to counsel was not limited to the trial itself, the
extent of this guaarntee was in doubt until Miranda. While Miranda thus extends the doctrines of
several decisions, it primarily clarifies and extends the holding of Escobedo, relating to the limitations
upon police interrogation.
"Acts 1965, ch. 722, TEX. CODE CIM. PRoc. ANN. arts. 15.17, 38.21-.23 (1966).
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recent times. On the one hand prosecutors and police argue that it is an in-
dispensable tool, the quickest, and often the only means of obtaining
needed information.'2 Those more concerned with due process considera-
tions argue that government should not impose penal sanctions upon the
basis of information obtained from the accused's own mouth. Contradic-
tions of a limited government, however, are not to be resolved by choosing
between conflicting values, but rather by harmonizing potentially comple-
mentary ideas. To reconcile these views the role of the police in a limited
governmental system must be examined.
A principal function of police in the criminal process is to prevent
criminal activity. 4 The mores of society and the threat of ultimate appre-
hension are the basic factors deterring criminal conduct. However, the
affirmative presence of police power also serves to prevent crime, and there-
fore at the periphery of legal police conduct are such devices as momentary
detention, impromptu searching or questioning, and arresting and releasing
practices." While these tools are either extra-legal or illegal, they serve as
a powerful deterent to criminal conduct." Interrogation has been used as a
similar instrument for the control of society. Just as the arrest procedure
can and has been used to apprehend prostitutes, gamblers, drunks, and
similar violators without the intention of prosecution,' so also the interro-
gation procedure can be used as an end in itself, by imposing sanctions of a
kind at this stage, frightening and harrassing the individual."
Once a crime is committed, however, the function of the police turns
to its detection, and the apprehension of its perpetrators. This function is in
large measure accomplished by independent investigation. While police
science as an empirical study has advanced amazingly during the last cen-
tury, "the art of criminal investigation has not developed to a point where
the search for and the examination of physical evidence will always, or
" "Many criminal cases, even when investigated by the best qualified police departments, are
capable of solution only by means of an admission or confession from the guilty individual or upon
the basis of information obtained from the questioning of other criminal suspects." Inbau, Police
Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 147 (Sowle ed.
1965).
""[T]here is no longer a need for abusive questioning, or, indeed, in many cases for any ques-
tioning at all. A professional police renders its proof in a professional manner very much without
the defendant's personal participation and not by what today is a morally and legally abusive prac-
tice." Mueller, The Law Relating to Police Interrogation, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREE-
DOM 145-46 (Sowle ed. 1965).
" CLIPT, GUIDE TO MODERN POLICE THINKING 18 (2d ed. 1965) classifies police functions in
this manner: "(1) preservation of the public-peace, (2) protection of life and property, (3) pre-
vention of crime, (4) enforcement of the laws, and (5) arresting of offenders and recovery of
property."








even in most cases, reveal a clue to the identity of the perpetrator.""0 Inter-
rogation facilitates detection and apprehension in two ways: first, by secur-
ing information otherwise unavailable to the police, and, second, by speed-
ing up police investigation. Interrogation may take the form of question-
ing actual suspects or of questioning individuals not actually suspected to
obtain information implicating others.'M Questioning in order to obtain
information, the "fishing expedition" of the interrogation process, has been
defended vigorously because this is an area where the only clue to the per-
petration of crime may be locked up in the mind of a witness or suspect. 1
Denying the opportunity to question here, it is argued, will permit the
guilty to go unpunished.2 And such interrogation might serve to dispell
suspicions of the innocent."
A related function of law enforcement officials is to provide prosecutors
with evidence sufficient to obtain a conviction. The confession is a favored
type of evidence. Emphasis upon confession as proof of guilt is a carry-
over from the medieval practice of requiring confessions for convictions"
-hence the inquisition, and in England the atrocious peine forte et dure.2
This emphasis upon confessions, although somewhat diluted, has continued
to the present day. Moreover, the impact of the confession upon the jury
is likely to be greater than that obtained by merely circumstantial evi-
dence, and prosecutors are therefore understandably desirous of strengthen-
ing their cases in this manner. While a recent study by the Los Angeles
District Attorney's office has indicated that the necessity for confessions
is not as great in securing convictions as had been previously supposed,"
there is no doubt that to some extent confessions lead to otherwise unob-
tainable convictions.
By serving as an instrument of control, of incrimination, and of sub-
stantiating a case, interrogation is a tool which can effectively increase po-
lice efficiency. When the purpose of interrogation is to verify a case, its
goal is truth; but when it has the anterior purpose of societal control, its
goal is police efficiency. Interrogation has been used for all of these pur-
poses. Some, of course, are well within the legal framework of law en-
forcement. Some are not.
Control of society by administrative discretion cannot be seriously con-
sidered within the value system framework of a limited government. Un-
" INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 203 (1962).
"Id. at 88-120.
21 Inbau, supra note 12, at 147-48.
21 Ibid.
HId. at 150-52; INBAU & REID, op. cit. supra note 19, at 204.
" Mueller, supra note 13, at 145.
2 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 652 (2d ed. 1923).




bridled and unrestrained power is the antithesis of the system and cannot
exist within it. Strong arguments, however, can and have been made for
the retention of interrogation for informational purposes, especially cus-
todial interrogation of arrested persons. It has been argued that such inter-
rogation is the only method of solving many crimes and of removing sus-
picion from the innocent." It has been pointed out that criminal apprehen-
sion is a different sort of activity from the affairs of law-abiding citizens,
and consequently its methods must of necessity be "less refined."" s Limita-
tions upon interrogation are said to allow irreparable injury to society.
However, to protect the individual from unrestrained exercise of power,
limitations have been placed upon the use of interrogation. Both constitu-
tional and statutory restraints must be examined to determine the per-
missible scope of interrogation today.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF CONFESSIONS
Statements Deemed Admissible Early decisions determining the ad-
missibility of challenged confessions emphasized the veracity of the state-
ment rather than the voluntary nature of its procurement." Increasing
attention, however, has been directed to voluntariness in recent years, and
today the truth of a statement is not at issue until its voluntary nature has
been ascertained."0 Voluntariness is no longer strictly a fact question, how-
ever. Instead, the imposition of more stringent constitutional and statu-
tory restraints upon law enforcement require that statements be taken only
under specified procedures. While enforcement of both constitutional and
statutory restraints is primarily predicated upon negating confessions unless
obtained in accordance with required procedures, the scope of constitu-
tional limitations has been broader than those imposed by state legislatures.
Miranda, on the one hand, sets out explicit requirements for all interroga-
tion, irrespective of whether the goal is a confession or merely informa-
tion. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, on the other hand, looks ex-
27 INBAtT, supra note 12, at 150-52; INBAU & REID, Op. cit. supra note 19, at 204.
2 INBAU & REID, op. cit. supra note 19, at 207.
"In Strait v. State, 43 Tex. 486 (1875), the Texas Supreme Court approved of the fact that
the lower court "admitted so much of the statements as was thus shown to be true." Id. at 488.
Many of the English and American precedents are discussed in People of Illinois v. Fox, 319 Il1. 606,
150 N.E. 347 (1926).
" Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that:
[O]ur decisions . . . have made clear that convictions following the admission
into evidence of confessions which are involuntary . . . cannot stand. This is so
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used
to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal
law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which
the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may
not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.
Id. at 540-41. It has also been stated that "the constitutional inquiry is . . . whether the confession
was 'free and voluntary'." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
1967]
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clusively to the confession." Under both standards no direct sanctions con-
trol police interrogation when there is no intention of prosecution.
Another difference in emphasis between Miranda and the new code is
the nature of the statement covered by each. Miranda is concerned with all
"statements to police." The term "statements to police" includes those
oral or written confessions or partial admissions inculpatory or exculpatory
in nature produced as a result of in-custody interrogation." Thus any state-
ment to police made in response to interrogation is covered by the deci-
sion. Excluded, however, are spontaneous voluntary admissions made by
an individual prior to being placed in custody. As Mr. Chief Justice War-
ren states:
Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences
is, of course, admissible in evidence .... There is no requirement that police
stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess
to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other
statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not
barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by
our holding today. 3
The Texas code, however, primarily regulates use of written confessions,
setting out strict standards of form, and making inadmissible all types of
oral admissions when the defendant is in police custody except possibly
the res gestae.' The new Texas provisions are concerned with both ad-
missions to a magistrate (judicial confessions) and those made prior to in-
dictment while the suspect is in the custody of police (extra-judicial). The
former normally present no question of voluntariness; the latter often do.
Article 38.21 of the code provides that a confession is admissible only "if
it appear that the same was freely made without compulsion or persua-
sion." The legislature implemented this requirement in article 38.22 by
declaring all confessions inadmissible, and then by enumerating exceptions
to this general rule aimed at guaranteeing that a statement was voluntar-
ily made.3
In its emphasis upon form, the code seems to require that a confession
be witnessed by some person other than the police.a The name of the mag-
3' TEX. CODE CRim. PROC. ANN. arts. 38.21-23 (1965).
Z2 384 U.S. 436 at 444, 476-77.
3 84 U.S. 436 at 478.
S"The test in this state is spontaneity." Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1966).
See also the cases cited in Moore v. State, 380 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. 1964). The Rubenstein case
reaffirms this principle under the new code.
3' TEX. CODE CRI.M. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.21 (1965).
3 TEx. CODE CRINI. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.22 (1965).
a"TEX. CODE CalM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22(3) (1965) provides that a confession shall be
inadmissible unless, "In connection with said confession lie makes statement [sic] of facts or cir-
cumstances that are found to be true, which conduce to establish his guilt; such as the finding of
secreted or stolen property, or the instrument with which he states the offense was committed,
such statement shall not be admitted in evidence, unless it is witnessed by some person other than a
[Vol. 21
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istrate administering the warning, as well as the date and time of this
event, must be included on the written statement."5 However, an exacting
compliance with statutory formalities has never been emphasized by the
court of criminal appeals,' and therefore minor variations may be per-
mitted.
Warnings In placing limitations upon interrogation procedure the focus
of both Miranda and the new code is upon warnings. Today article 15.17
provides that the accused must be advised at his arraignment of his con-
stitutional rights. This warning to the accused must include (1) notifica-
tion of the charges against him, and of any affidavit filed therewith; (2)
advisement of his right to an examining trial, and to make bail; (3) in-
formation that there is no requirement that the suspect make a statement
and that any statement may be used against him; and (4) notification as
to his right to retain counsel, and of his right to have counsel appointed if
he is unable to procure this assistance.40 Article 15.17 further provides that
at arraignment "the magistrate shall allow the person arrested reasonable
time and opportunity to consult counsel."' According to interpretive com-
mentary' the latter requirement was inserted in response to the decision of
Escobedo v. Illinois.' Escobedo guaranteed counsel in certain instances, but
there was no clear answer as to the extent of its protection. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals had interpreted Escobedo to require counsel
only where the accused had requested the assistance." Article 15.17 seems to
peace officer, who shall sign the same as a witness." (Emphasis added.) As it presently reads, of
course, this provision makes little sense. In a special commentary Justice Onion sugests potential
problems of construction: whether all statements must now be in writing so that some person
other than a peace officer will have something to sign, or whether the. third person could merely
witness the signature of the officer of his report of the incident. Justice Onion further suggests
that the present wording was a typographical error resulting from the omission of a sentence
referring to confessions of illiterate persons. Onion, Special Commentary, 4 TEx. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. ANN. 487 (1966).
"STEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22(2) (1965).
"
5 See Delespine v. State, 396 S.W.2d 133 (1965) (signature of only the first name of the de-
fendant on the confession is sufficient); Pate v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 126, 345 S.W.2d 532 (1961)
(a confession does not have to be dictated in the words of the accused); Sutton v. State, 166 Tex.
Crim. 580, 317 S.W.2d 58 (1958) (action by two officers, referred to in the confession as one in-
dividual, does not vitiate a confession).
'Tux. CooE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 15.17 (1966). It has been noted that, as of publication
date of the code, Texas is the only state which requires a warning. Onion, Special Commentary, 4
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 486 (1966).
" TEX. CODE CRIrs. PRoc. ANN. art. 15.17 (1965).
4 Morrison, Special Commentary, 4 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 485 (1966).
43378 U.S. 478 (1964).
44 Ex park Bertsch, 395 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1965). The interpretations of Escobedo have been
many and varied. California's interpretation was one of the broadest. In California v. Durado, 398
P.2d 361 (Cal. 1965) the California Supreme Court declared: "The question presented here then
centers upon whether the failure of the accused to retain or request counsel justifies the application
of a rule of law different from that established in Escobedo. The basic reasoring of the court's
opinion in Escobedo will not permit such a formalistic distinction." Id. at 367. The Fifth Circuit
agreed that a request for counsel under Escobedo is not required. Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823
(5th Cir. 1965).
Texas courts, however, were not inclined to read such broad requirements into the Escobedo
1967]
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broaden this holding, affording the right to consult with an attorney with-
out a request. However, the new code does not go so far as to require spe-
cifically that counsel be present at the interrogation itself.
Miranda, like the Texas code, emphasizes warnings. The warning re-
quired by this decision must include the following: (1) that the suspect
may remain silent;" (2) that his statements may be used against him at a
later trial;41 (3) that he is entitled to the presence of counsel at this inter-
rogation;47 and (4) that if he cannot afford counsel an attorney will be ap-
pointed to represent him."s This warning appears mandatory to the admis-
sion of any subsequent confession. As the Court declares, "no amount of
circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right
will suffice" in place of a warning."
Problems of correlation are minimized by the extensive reorganization
which was undertaken by the Texas code, anticipating many of the rules
of Miranda. While both Miranda and the new code declare that an accused
must be warned (1) of his right to remain silent; (2) of potential use of
his statements; and (3) of his right to retained or appointed counsel,
Miranda states that the only method for implementing the latter right is to
allow counsel to be present at interrogation proceedings. Although the code
allows the suspect to consult with counsel at this stage, it does not guaran-
tee him the presence of counsel at the interrogation itself. In other respects
the warning provided by the Texas code is broader than that required by
Miranda, incorporating as it does statutory as well as constitutional require-
ments.
The Texas code, unlike Miranda, provides two warnings. First the suspect
must be taken "immediately" before the magistrate for administering of
opinion. The basic limitation imposed by the Texas courts was to require that the suspect request
the presence of counsel. Ex Parte Bertsch, 395 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1965). Texas decisions imposed
the additional requirement that the suspect testify to his request for the assistance of counsel. Corry
v. State, 390 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1965). This requirement merely reflected the Texas rule that ques-
tions of admissibility must be raised at the trial. McKinney v. State, 391 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. 1965);
Conley v. State, 390 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1965). The Texas rule that failure to request counsel
acted as a waiver of this right was directly contra" to dicta in an earlier United States Supreme
Court case, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), where the Court declared that "the right
to be furnished counsel does not depend upon a request," id. at 513, but nevertheless found addi-
tional circumstances which amounted to a waiver. Cf., McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961).
For additional Texas interpretations of Escobedo, see Hinkey v. State, 389 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.
1965); Davis v. State, 388 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1965); Mathews v. State, 388 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.
1965); Miller v. State, 387 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1965), 17 BAYLOR L. REV. 376.
4' 384 U.S. 436 at 467-68.
46 Id. at 469.
41 Ibid.
48 Id. at 472.
" In effect the decision overrules the decision of Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958),
where a confession was admitted on the basis of circumstantial evidence that the accused was aware
of his constitutional rights. The dissent in Miranda declares that this case is expressly overruled.
[Vol. 21
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the warning." In addition, article 38.22 (2) commands that the written
statement "must further show that the person to whom the confession is
made warned the accused"'" that he was not required to make a statement
and that it might be later used against him. Thus a double warning is pro-
vided, emphasizing the legislative concern that the suspect be sufficiently
informed.52 It seems that there are good reasons for incorporating the
Miranda warning concerning the right to the presence of counsel at inter-
rogation into the warning administered by the magistrate under the present
statute. First, the magistrate can probably appoint counsel for indigents
although the police cannot." Second, the magistrate's warning is free from
any taint of coercion that might accompany a warning administered by the
police. Third, the magistrate should possess sufficient legal experience to
so LeFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The judge's Role in Making and Reviewing
Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 996 n.47 (1965) lists four advantages for
prompt appearance before a magistrate: (1) to review the grounds for arrest; (2) to limit coercion;
(3) to give the suspect a chance to make contact with counsel or friends; and (4) to 'allow him
the rights of bail, counsel, and simil.r guarantees.
"'TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.22(2) (1965).
" The code seems to provide an alternative to administering a warning; see note 37 suprd, art.
38.22(3). The section is somewhat vague, and it is difficult to determine whether the legislature
intended to require additional corroboration or merely to validate a confession which was truthful
although potentially involuntary. Reading this passage as an alternative to warning the suspect and
not as a requirement in addition to voluntariness, however, is in line with Texas law as it existed
prior to 1925. Article 38.22(3) is a direct quote from TLx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 727 (1925);
although similar language appears even earlier, this passage seems to be taken directly from the case
of Weller v. State, 16 Tex. App. 200 (1884):
At common law . . . a confession induced by promises or threats . . . such as
might have influenced the mind of the prisoner in making the confession would not
be evidence against him under any circumstances. (Citations omitted.) But, while this
is the general rule prescribed by the provisions of our statute, we think that statute
makes an exception. . . . Where, in connection with .the confession, the prisoner
makes a statement of facts or circumstances that are found to be true, which conduce
to establish his guilt, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property, or instrument
with which he states the offense was committed, then, in our opinion, his entire con-
fession, as well as his statements to such extraneous facts, are admissible evidence
against him.
Id. at 211-12.
Thus, under this interpretation of the statute even a coerced confession was admissible when cor-
roborated. See also Selvidge v. State, 30 Tex. 60 (1867); Johnson v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 291,
238 S.W. 933 (1922); Oritz v. State, 68 Tex. Crim. 524, 151 S.W. 1056 (1912); Allison v. State,
14 Tex. App. 122 (1883). It seems that this passage is an anachronism inadvertently remaining in
the statute, and, in the face of present constitutional standards, supra note 30, cannot be read as an
alternative to warning the suspect of his rights.
This requirement is in no way connected with proof of the corpus delecti. While any confession
must be corroborated by a showing that a crime was in fact committed (see Preston v. State, 157
Tex. Crim. 228, 242 S.W.2d 436 (1961); Hernandez v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 159, 8 S.W.2d 947
(1927)), art. 38.22(3) requires that the evidence obtained as the fruit of the confession must
"conduce to establish his guilt." (Emphasis added.) Thus this evidence is entirely distinct from
that required to show the corpus delecti, and seems to imply that. the truthfulness of the confession
will render it admissible.53 TEX. CODE CluM. PRoc. art. 16.01 (1966) gives the magistrate the power to appoint counsel
in certain instances, at least for the examining trial itself. There is some question, due in part to
the wording of the statute, as to whether the magistrate can appoint counsel in other instances. See
Semann, Bail, Examining Trials, Magistrate Justice and Corporation Courts, Right to Counsel in
Magistrate Courts, 29 TEXAS B.J. 245 (1966).
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insure that this warning adequately complies with the statutory and con-
stitutional requirements.
Waiver Under the Texas Code a confession is admissible once the state
establishes that the statutory warning was administered and that the writ-
ten confession complies with the requirements of form. Federal constitu-
tional requirements, however, are not so easily satisfied. Under Miranda
the police must take affirmative steps to protect the rights of individuals in
addition to administering the warning. For example, under Miranda no
questioning can continue after an accused has declared that he no longer
wishes to submit to interrogation. " Once it has been established that the
statement has followed the administration of a warning or a "fully effec-
tive equivalent,"55 the prosecution's problem is to prove that there was an
intelligent waiver of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, and, in the absence of counsel, a waiver of this guarantee. In Miranda
the Court declares that if statements made during the period of custodial
interrogation are to be admisisble "a heavy burden rests on" the state to
prove voluntariness."6 The Court declared, "since the State is responsible
for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation
takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evi-
dence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden
is rightly on its shoulders." 7 In effect, the Court has created almost a "pre-
sumption of perjury" 8 against the police.
Partial admissions do not constitute a waiver of constitutional rights; 9
nor can waiver be presumed from a silent record."0 There must be affirma-
tive evidence "that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel." 1 The easiest method of proving waiver of the self-incrimination
protection is to demonstrate the presence of counsel at the interrogation."
However, as has been pointed out, 3 in most cases no attorney will advise a
suspect to talk to police."
Proving waiver of the right to counsel may be far more difficult. The
prosecution must show that an adequate warning was given before the
54 384 U.S. 436 at 473-74.
' Id. at 476. The Court never explains what would constitute a "fully effective equivalent."
" Id. at 475.
5 ibid.
5 GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 120 (1966).
"'384 U.S. 436 at 475-76.
60 Id. at 475.
01 Ibid.
6" Id. at 474 n.44.
"3Mr. Justice Jackson, in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949).
04 In addition, the attorney may be able to testify to the presence of any coercive circumstances.
384 U.S. 436 at 470.
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waiver occurred, and "no amount of circumstantial evidence that the per-
son may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead."'5
Evaluation of the Confession The criteria for determining the voluntary
nature of the statement has evolved from Miranda and other United States
Supreme Court decisions. When the new code was enacted, police conduct
was measured by the general yardstick of due process," as evaluated through
the "totality of the circumstances" doctrine.67 Escobedo v. Illinois, although
confined to its particular facts by many interpretations, indicated that a
more specific standard for determining voluntariness would be applied."8
Miranda establishes this standard.
Before Miranda and the new Texas code a confession was generally ad-
missible unless the defense introduced evidence to block its admission. 69
Miranda and the Texas code require that the state first establish a prima
facie case of voluntariness by showing adequate warning and waiver, in
order to secure the admission of any confession. Upon such showing the
65 See note 49 sujsra.
"Note, Constitutional Law--Pointer v. Texas-Guarantee of an Accused's Right To Confront
the Witnesses Against Him in a State Proceeding According to Federal Standards, 19 Sw. L.J. 632
(1965) presents an excellent description of the due process theories and cites the foremost authori-
ties.
67 The treatment accorded to state confession cases by the Supreme Court has varied considerably
since the issue was first presented in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The first standard
was based on ascertaining if there was evidence of actual coercion from the entire record, in which
case the confession was declared to conflict with the requirement of due process of the fourteenth
amendment. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), however, Mr. Justice Black laid down
the "inherently coercive" test, determining coercion on an abstract appraisal of the facts, and not
on the probable effect which such facts would have on the particular defendant. But cf., Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. $96 (1944). The "inherently coercive" criteria was again applied in the ab-
stract in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) ("humiliating" the defendant held inherently
coercive) and in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. $69 (1948) (same). See also Mr. Justice Jackson in
Watts v. Indiana, 338 US. 49, 57 (1949).
The Truman appointees seemed to effect a change in the attitude of the Court. In Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U.S. $$ (1951), and Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), the Court returned
to tle test of voluntariness which had been used prior to tle first Ailscraft decision. The test em-
ployed in these cases was to determine if there was voluntariness in fact, and not to judge the cir-
cumstances in the abstract. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) carried this retreat further
and declared that a conviction could stand unless there was an "actual overpowering of the will"
of this defendant in obtaining the confession, clearly an ail hoc test.
Subsequently, however, a change again occurred in the Court's attitude. Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191 (1957) declared that the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the procurement
of a confession was such as to coerce the defendant, although there was no evidence of actual phy-
sical brutality or psychological tricks. Tsis test was also employed in Blackburn v. Alabama, 354
U.S. 393 (1957), and Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). For the application of the doctrine
see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961);
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 229 (1940). Some doubt is cast upon this doctrine by Miranda and
Escobedo. In Escobedo the Court expressly spoke of this doctrine, when it declared that in previous
cases, "applying 'these principles' to 'the sum total of the circumstances during the time petitioner
was without counsel,' " the Court had determined that there was no coercion. The Court in Esco-
bedo thereupon expressly overruled the portions of the decisions under question: Cicenia v. Lagay,
357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). At the preesnt time there seems
to be a combination of previous tests, coupled with a presumption of invalidity when required
procedures are not met. The ad hoc "totality" doctrine, however, is by no means dead.
es Sec note 44 supra.
61 See note 67 supsra.
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confession becomes admissible unless the defendant can bring forth other
factors to which he attributes coercion." Although the evidence of the ac-
cused seems to weigh more heavily than that of the prosecution, and al-
though the burden of meeting any evidence of coercion is basically upon
the state, in the final analysis this decision merely requires additional
methods of procedure. It does not impose upon the police the impossible
task of proving that at no time during the period of custody was coercion
present. Prior to Miranda Texas law gave greater credence to the evidence
of the prosecution by requiring some showing of a causal connection be-
tween the defendant's evidence and the statement which he made."1 Miran-
da, however, provides that many facts, such as delay in arraignment, or the
use of trickery or psychological pressure, are in themselves strong evidence
of coercion without any showing of a causal connection to the making of
the statement," and must therefore be met by the prosecution.
The procedure for challenging a confession in Texas follows the deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno,"' embodying
the so-called Massachusetts Rule for determining the voluntary nature of a
statement. Texas article 38.22, codifying this rule, provides that upon
challenge at the trial the judge holds a hearing outside the presence of the
jury at which he permits the introduction of all relevant evidence. 4 The
statement is then admitted only if the judge is satisfied that it was made
with the free choice of the defendant. If the judge determines that the con-
fession was voluntary he submits it to the jury. If there is any evidence
of coercion, the jury is instructed to make an independent determination
of the voluntariness of the confession and to disregard it unless they decide
that there was no compulsion in its procurement.
III. SUMMARY: THE TEXAS RULE AFTER MIRANDA
Today Texas law relating to admissions made by a suspect during inter-
rogation may be briefly summarized as follows:
70 If the state's evidence is not controverted the confession is admissible. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S.
574 (1884). See, e.g., Conley v .State, 390 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1965); Marrufo v. State, 172 Tex.
Crim. 398, 357 S.W.2d 761 (1962).
71Smith v. Heard, 315 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963); Dixon v.
State, 397 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1966); Garza v. State, 397 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. 1965); Ferrell v. State,
397 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1965); Lopez v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 585, 352 S.W.2d 841 (1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 954 (1962); Smith v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 313, 350 S.W.2d 344, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 883 (1961). For a different factual situation see Ex Parte Bertsch, 395 S.W.2d 620
(Tex. 1965), holding that a 30-hour delay in arraignment over Sunday when the magistrate
was sick did not vitiate a confession made during this period.
" See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), 19 Sw. L.J. 384 (1965). See also 384
U.S. 436 at 476.
-a 378 U.S. 368 (1964), 18 Sw. L.J. 729. See also the Texas holdings, Lopez v. State, 384
S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1964), 43 TEXAS L. REv. 396 (1965); Smith v. Texas, 236 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.
Tex. 1964), 19 Sw. L.J. 190 (1965).




First, no questioning can began after the accused has been detained until
he is given an adequate warning of his rights. The accused must be taken
immediately before a magistrate, who must, notify him (1) of the charges
against him, and of any affidavit filed therewith; (2) of his right to an
examining trial, and to make bail; (3) of his right to remain silent and that
any statement, if made, may be later used against him; and (4) of his
right to retained or appointed counsel, and to consult therewith at this
time. It is suggested that since the magistrate probably has the power to
appoint counsel, which the police do not, and since he is empowered to in-
form the accused of the above rights, the magistrate should notify the sus-
pect at this time (5) that he has the right to have counsel present at any
interrogation; and (6) that he-does not have to submit to any interroga-
tion against his wishes.
Because failure to give this warning prior to the beginning of questioning
will invalidate any confession made later, the police should be extremely
careful not to question the suspect prior to this point. One definite advan-
tage of this procedure to the prosecution is that a waiver of the right to
counsel at this stage will be far easier to prove if made before the magis-
trate than if made while the suspect is held in the custody of police.
Second, before any confession is made in response to interrogation the
person to whom it is made should again warn the accused (1) that he may
remain silent, and (2) that any statement which he makes may later be
used against him.
Third, a confession should be witnessed by one person not an employee
of the police, and must be in the required form showing that both warnings
were administered in accordance with law."
Fourth, prior to the admission of the confession into evidence the prose-
cution has a heavy burden to prove that there was a freely made, intelligent
waiver of the above-enumerated rights.
Fifth, if the prosecution meets this burden the defendant must bring for-
ward other coercive circumstances.
Sixth, if the judge is satisfied in a hearing away from the jury that the
admission is voluntarily made and constitutes a valid waiver of the consti-
tutionally protected freedom from self-incrimination, it is received in evi-
dence. The issue of its voluntariness must be submitted to the jury if there
is any evidence to justify such an instruction, with instructions that they
should disregard the confession or the fruits thereof if found to have been
involuntary.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The procedures required by Miranda and the new code are admittedly a
75 See note 37 supra.
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limitation upon police efficiency, justified by a concern for the basic free-
doms of the individual. The question remains: will these limitations serve
to protect individuals without placing unnecessary burdens on law en-
forcement?
Statutes have long required "immediate" arraignment."6 These new rules
merely put teeth into the requirement by invalidating confessions obtained
without compliance with this safeguard. Warning a suspect of his basic
rights serves only to place the ill-informed on a parity with their more en-
lightened counterparts. The ignorant, not the habitual criminal, is likely
to be protected by the warning requirement.
The presence of counsel at interrogation, however, is another matter-
is this really justified? Should the attorney defend his client at interroga-
tion, or does he have an obligation to reach truth? Heretofore, a de-
fense counsel has been an advocate, stoutly maintaining the innocence of
his client. This is the role which he must assume when trial commences. Is
it, then, reasonable to assume that a defense counsel will be interested in
allowing the prosecution to obtain evidence to convict his client? Further,
would such a role be violative of professional ethics and the duty which the
attorney owes to his client? As the Canons of Professional Ethics point out,
"having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair and
honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land per-
mits. '"" It cannot reasonably be assumed that defense counsel will abandon
his role as partisan advocate during the interrogation. As a well-informed
defender of the accused, he will be a great hindrance to police. No longer
will psychological methods, such as those described by "police manuals,"7
be effective.
Is the requirement of counsel justified in light of the obstacle which it
will raise for police? The answer must be an emphatic "yes." While there
are other methods which might serve the same function," the attorney now
has this responsibility. Allowing counsel at interrogation is merely extend-
ing back to the police station those rights which are so solemnly accorded
at the trial, and which are wholly ineffective at the trial if abridged long
before, during interrogation. Unless the ignorant are to be denied rights
available to their better-informed counterparts the presence of the attorney
is essential.
" TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 727 (1925).
77See Vorenberg, Police Detention and. Interrogation of Uncounselled Suspects: The Supreme
Court and the States, 44 B.U.L. REV. 423 (1964).
71 Canon 5, Canons of Professional Ethics.
7' The following have been cited as examples of police manuals: ARTHUR & CAPUTO, INTER-
ROGATION FOR INVESTIGATORS (1959); DIENSTEIN, TECHNIQUES FORL TIlE CRIME INVESTIGATOR
(1952); Kim), POLICE INTERROGATION (1940); MULBAR, INTERROGATION (1951); O'1tARA, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1956), as well as INBAU & REID, Op. Cit. supra note 19.
So See notes 83 and 84 infra, and accompanying text.
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The police are handicapped by the new rules; they are not handcuffed.
Recent studies have indicated that only a small percentage of cases actually
require a confession for conviction.'1 When those instances in which addi-
tional police work could have uncovered sufficient evidence for conviction
and those in which the confession was not actually necessary to convict are
taken into consideration, the number of cases in this category may be com-
paratively small. Moreover, considerable latitude for permissible interro-
gation still remains: of the individual before he is actually "placed in
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action,""2 of the individual
who is willing to be interrogated with or without counsel, and of indi-
viduals who are not suspects. The prohibition of the new rules applies only
to protect those who are accused and who do not wish to confess. Neverthe-
less, there are those cases where only by custodial interrogation can police
solve a particular crime. Whether such a confession would be obtained by
the blunt questions of police, by the subtle tactics of police psychologists,
by threats or promises, or by the use of a rubber hose or gun butt, the result
is the same-eliciting a confession from one against his will, to be used to
secure his conviction.
Other methods for securing the rights of individuals, and yet allowing
police broader latitude, come to mind. Judicial interrogation, or -the pres-
ence of the judge at police interrogation, a limited interrogation, as to either
time or tactics," and the use of electronic devices such as tape recorders, or
motion pictures, to record the events of interrogation, all have been pro-
posed as an effective method of reconciling the rights of individuals with
the needs of law enforcement. Each of these solutions recognizes the seem-
ingly contradictory requirements of the concept of limited government,
the individual's right to be free from abuse, and society's right to prevent
violations of the law. The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. New
Jersey5 indicates that there'may be some other method for achieving the
necessary compromise. In declaring that Miranda and Escobedo have no
retroactive effect Johnson emphasizes that these cases impose a means of
judicial enforcement of a constitutional command.
As has been pointed out," much interrogation is unnecessary to convict
violators-it merely serves to strengthen an existing case. In those cases
where interrogation of the arrested person without administering a warn-
8 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
2 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
83 Pound, Legal Interrogations of Persons Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 1016
(1934). This seems to be a favorite proposal. See also LaFave & Remington, supra note 50, at 988.
"'Williams, Interrogation, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 185-87 (Sowle ed.
1965); Vouin, id., at 193-96.
5 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See also Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (right to counsel under
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (exclusion-
ary rule).
'
0 Scc note 26 supra, and accompanying text.
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ing is essential, as, for example, where police seek to extricate a kidnap
victim, the effect of Miranda and of the Texas rules will be to free the
suspect. While these rules only prohibit interrogation after the suspect has
been arrested, it must be admitted that some violators, often guilty of the
most heinous crimes, will go free. This obviously disturbing result, that
the criminal is freed because the constable blundered, is not new to Amer-
ican jurisprudence, however. Given unlimited authority law enforcement
could be more efficient, and yet the rights of individuals would suffer in the
balance.
